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CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION AND
LAND USE: EXPLORING THE FEDERAL
ROLE*
ALICE KASWAN**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Scientists agree that climate change impacts are already
Measures to reduce, or
occurring and will only get worse.'
"mitigate," greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are, of course, of
central importance. However, even if the international community
adopted robust measures to mitigate GHG emissions, accumulated
GHGs would nonetheless continue to warm the planet and change
its climate. 2 And the truth is that worldwide GHG emissions are
increasing, not decreasing, with little sign of an imminent
turnaround.3 Consequently, policymakers must focus not only on
* This essay is adapted from a longer article: Alice Kaswan, Climate
Adaptation and Land Use Governance: The Vertical Axis, 39 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. - (forthcoming 2014). That article highlights the features of a multilevel
governance approach to land use-related adaptation. The longer piece
provides a more in-depth justification, grounded in federalism theory, for a
greater federal role within a multilevel governance structure.
** Professor of Law, University of San Francisco School of Law. I am grateful
to Celeste Hammond and The John Marshall Law Review for inviting me to
participate in the Kratovil Symposium on Adaptation of the Built
Environment to Climate Change.
1. See generally Global Climate Change Impacts in the United States, U.S.
GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM 9 (Susan J. Hassol et el eds., 2009),

at
http://downloads.globalchange.gov/usimpacts/pdfs/cimateavailable
impacts-report.pdf [hereinafter USGCRP REPORT] (describing climate change
impacts within the U.S.). In 2014, the U.S. Global Change Research Program
will complete the Third National Climate Assessment; a draft of the report is
available at http://www.globalchange.gov/what-we-do/assessment/draft-reportinformation. See also Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate
Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis: Working Group I Contributionto the
Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
SUMMARY

FOR

POLICYMAKERS,

available

at

http://www.climatechange2013.org/spm (describing the international impacts
of climate change).
2. Adapting to the Impacts of Climate Change, THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES
PRESS 31 (2010), available at http://www.climateneeds.umd.edu/reports/NRCAdapting%20to%20the%2OImpacts%20of%20Climate%20Change.pdf.
3. See Global Carbon Budget 2013, GLOBAL CARBON PROJECT (Nov.
at
available
2013),
http://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/13/les/GCPbudget_.2013.p
df / (showing that both total C02 emissions and the C02 atmospheric
concentration growth rates are still increasing).
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mitigating emissions, but also on adapting to climate change.
In the United States, adapting to a wide range of climate
impacts will implicate many legal domains, including disaster law,
water law, environmental law, natural resources law, agricultural
law, immigration law, housing law, and land use law. 4 This essay
focuses on land use governance. Because land use law plays a
critical role in determining where and how we live, our land use
response to - and preparation for - climate change will strongly

determine our capacity to adapt. It is time to rethink land use
federalism because the existing reliance on local control, overlaid
as it may be with state and federal influences, is unlikely to result
in a sufficient response to the climate change challenge. Effective,
democratic, and fair governance requires a more integrated and
comprehensive federal, state, and local response.
This Essay identifies key functions essential to improving
land use law's capacity to serve adaptation and suggests a better
balance of federal and local power to accomplish those functions.
Although new federal adaptation legislation may ultimately be
necessary, the principles described in the essay could guide the
exercise of existing federal authority, inspire legislative or
administrative revisions to existing federal programs, and
ultimately influence new and comprehensive federal adaptation
initiatives.
Part I introduces a range of climate impacts and describes the
important role of land use law in adaptation. Part II provides a
snapshot of the current state of land use related adaptation
measures at the federal, state, and local levels, concluding that the
status quo is not sufficient. Part III describes the value of a
multigovernance approach to land use related adaptation. It
begins by emphasizing the essential role of state and local
governments. It next explains why the federal government should
nonetheless require land use related climate impact assessments
and adaption planning and, to a limited extent, why the federal
government should define certain minimum parameters to guide
state and local adaptation planning and programs. Part IV
identifies three practical functions the federal government could
offer, including providing information resources, providing
financial
resources,
and
providing
interagency
and
multijurisdictional coordination. Part V offers a few words about
the proposal's political feasibility.
4. See J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural
Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363, 411 (2010)
(describing the many areas of law implicated by adaptation). The fact that
climate change impacts will involve so many different areas of the law is one
of the unique challenges facing "adaptation law." See generally J.B. Ruh1 &
James Salzman, Climate Change Meets the Law of the Horse, 62 DUKE L.J. 975
(2013) (discussing whether adaptation law represents its own legal field or is,
instead, simply a piecemeal combination of legal issues).
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CLIMATE IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND THE ROLE OF LAND USE
MEASURES

A. Climate ChangeImpacts and Adaptation
Although climate change is a global issue, this Essay focuses
on U.S. climate impacts and the domestic response to those
impacts. 5 Scientists predict that by 2100, thermal expansion from
warming oceans and an influx of melted polar ice will raise sea
levels by one to four feet.6 The greatest harm from rising sea
levels will be caused by higher storm surges that wreak extensive
damage on heavily populated coastal areas.7 Many of these areas
already suffer from aging infrastructure that is ill-prepared to
withstand current conditions, much less worsening future
conditions.8 Precipitation will change as some areas, including the
Midwest and Northeast, experience higher levels of rainfall,9 often
in more intense form with higher flood risks.10 Other areas,
5. This Essay's focus on domestic impacts is not intended to slight the
severity of anticipated climate impacts elsewhere on the globe. Nonetheless,
global adaptation presents a completely different set of legal questions from
domestic adaptation. Moreover, the severity of impacts elsewhere does not
lessen the importance of developing a more robust domestic institutional
response in the United States.
6. Third National Climate Assessment (Draft) U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE
at
available
(2013),
63-65
PROGRAM,
RESEARCH
http://ncadac.globalchange.gov/download/NCAJan1 1-2013-publiereviewdraftfulldraft.pdf [hereinafter Draft Third Assessment]. Local sea level rise will
vary due to shifts in land levels and changing ocean currents. See Asbury H.
Sallenger, Jr., et al., Hotspot of accelerated sea-level rise on the Atlantic coast
of North America, NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 884 (2012), available at
http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nclimate1597.html
(observing higher levels of sea level rise in the mid-Atlantic due to changing
ocean currents); see also Impacts of Climate Change and Variability on
TransportationSystems and Infrastructure: Gulf Coast Study, Phase I, U.S.
CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM, 3-18-3-23 (Virginia R. Burkett, et al.
eds., 2008), available at http://downloads.globalchange.gov/sap/sap4-7/sap4-7final-all.pdf (observing higher levels of sea level rise along the Gulf Coast due
to subsiding land levels); Sea-Level Rise for the Coasts of California, Oregon,
and Washington:Past, Present, and Future, THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS,
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record
available at
(2012),
5-7
id=13389&page=l (observing lower levels of sea level rise in the Pacific
Northwest due to rising land levels).
7. See Draft Third Assessment, supra note 6, at 876 (noting that higher
sea levels and storm surges pose risks to water supplies, energy infrastructure
and evacuation routes on the coast). While no individual storm can be
attributed to climate change, Hurricane Sandy, which devastated coastal
areas in New Jersey, New York, and other northeastern states, demonstrated
the power of higher seas and increasingly intense storms. Eric S. Blake et al.,
Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Sandy, NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER
at
available
2013),
12,
(Feb.
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL182012-Sandy.pdf.
8. Draft Third Assessment, supra note 6, at 420.
9. Id. at 42-46, 108.
Although the number of severe Atlantic
10. Id. at 47-51, 108-09.
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including the West and Southwest, are experiencing intensifying
droughts, jeopardizing water supplies." Drought, combined with
higher temperatures, also increases the risk of wildfires.12
Additionally, a range of public health consequences are likely,
including higher average temperatures, 3 more harmful heat
waves,14 and higher levels of air pollution triggered by higher
temperatures.' 5
Warmer water, increased precipitation, and
compromised sewage treatment capacity 6 will also cause new
water contamination challenges. The enhanced range of disease
vectors, like ticks and mosquitoes, will increase the spread of
disease and further impact public health. 7 A changing climate
also has profound impacts on species besides our own, creating
unprecedented threats to biodiversity as the climate changes
faster than endangered species can adapt or migrate. 8
hurricanes has increased in the last few decades, the climate dynamics
associated with hurricane and tornado intensity and frequency are more
uncertain than predictions of increasing precipitation and heavy rains. Id. at
59-62.
11. The Southwestern and Western states in the United States are
projected to receive less precipitation. Id. at 43-45. That, combined with
higher temperatures, is expected to lead to drought. Id. at 56-58, 113, 690.
Summer water shortages will be further intensified by a shift from snow to
rain, which impacts the degree to which the snowpack serves a water storage
function, providing snowmelt during the region's arid summers. Id. at 690-92.
The U.S. Global Change Research Program predicts that, by 2050, 32 percent
of counties will be at risk of water shortages. Id. at 295.
12. Id. at 694-95.
13. See id. at 35 (noting the average temperature increase of 1.5 degree
Fahrenheit since 1895 and the acceleration of this warming trend). By 2100,
scientists predict a 3-5 degrees Fahrenheit increase in average U.S.
temperatures under low emissions scenarios and a 5-10 degrees Fahrenheit
increase under high emissions scenarios. Id. at 35-36.
14. See id. at 51-55, 342-43 (describing evidence of a recent increase in the
incidence of heat waves, projections for increased heat wave events, and the
health impacts of increasing heat waves).
15. A reaction between nitrogen oxides and volatile organic compounds
causes ground-level ozone pollution. Because warmer weather enhances that
reaction, a given level of emissions will lead to higher ozone levels at higher
temperatures. Climate change will exacerbate the health threat to 108 million
people already living in areas of the country that fail to meet public health
standards for ozone. See Our Nation's Air: Status and Trends through 2010,
U.S.
ENVTL.
PROTECTION
AGENCY,
1
(2012),
available at
http://www.epa.gov/airtrends/2011/report/fullreport.pdf (showing the number
of Americans living in countries with unhealthy air quality concentrations of
ozone). See also Draft Third Assessment, supra note 6, at 334-35 (describing
increased risk from climate-related increases in ozone levels). Increasing
wildfires also have significant impacts on air quality, with consequent public
health effects. Id. at 340-41.
16. See id. at 117, 129, 292-94, 346-48 (discussing: indirect water pollution
risks from climate change impacts, the risk of increased sewage treatment
plant overflows, contamination from flood waters, and the risk of harmful
algae blooms from warmer water temperatures).
17. Id. at 343-45.
18. Id. at 296-97.
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Adaptation measures strive to increase resilience, and pursue
resilience by reducing exposure to harm, reducing underlying
sensitivity to impacts, and increasing the capacity to cope with
impacts when they occur.19 Factors influencing exposure include
natural geographic attributes (high or low ground), the presence of
buffers (levees or natural buffers like wetlands), and development
patterns (like floodplain development or dense urban settings
generating a heat island effect). Sensitivity is determined by the
degree of preparation (e.g., appropriate weather proofing and
preparedness plans), as well as by factors determined by
underlying socioeconomic conditions (e.g., the quality of the
housing stock and demographic factors such as age, income, race,
and underlying health risk factors). 20 The capacity to cope focuses
on what happens once impacts occur, including the ability to
respond to and recover from an extreme weather event (with
effective disaster response plans, cooling centers, and sufficient
personal, governmental, or insurance resources) or, as conditions
deteriorate, the ability to migrate and find housing.
B. The Role of Land Use Planningin Adapting to Climate Change
Land use planning is one of many public and private
strategies critical to adapting to future climate change impacts. 21
This section explores the role of land use in the context of several
climate change impacts. Land use law is critical to effective
disaster management, which will be of key importance as rising
sea levels and intensifying storms increase the frequency and
severity of disasters. More broadly (whether a consequence of
increasing disaster risk or other conditions, like heat or
insufficient water supplies), neighborhoods, regions, and other
parts of the world are likely to become less habitable, generating
internal and international migration and creating new areas of
housing demand. Moreover, land use law and urban design also
play key roles in addressing urban heat, water use, and
endangered species survival.
1. Land Use Law and Disasters
Because many climate change impacts will increase the risk
and severity of disasters, disaster law is highly relevant to climate
change adaptation. Land use patterns play a critical role in
determining vulnerability to direct harm, including exposure to
climate risks like flooding, erosion, and wildfire. Three central
adaptation strategies are available: protect, accommodate, and

19. Id. at 421.
20. See id. at 349-52, 425 (discussing socioeconomic variables' role in
determining the health impacts of climate change).
21. See generally, Ruhl, supra note 4, at 381 (describing the likely role for
both private and public actors).
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retreat. 22
Protection can take a variety of "hard" and "soft" forms.
Levees, a type of hard protection, impact land use and shape what
areas are suitable for development by controlling river flooding
and blocking sea level rise. Another hard protection measure is
seashore armoring through sea walls that protect against erosion.
"Soft" forms of protection include beach renourishment, which
impacts coastal property owners' rights in the shore land, and
preservation and development of natural buffers, such as coastal
and riparian wetlands, to slow floodwaters and control erosion.
Land use measures like conservation easements and development
moratoria can preserve existing wetland buffers. 23 In populated
areas, the creation of wetland buffers may require not only land
use conservation measures, but also planned retreat, discussed
below.
Accommodation to climate change can occur through a variety
of zoning and building code provisions. 24 For example, set-back
requirements create buffers between streams or areas at risk from
storm surge and development. Green infrastructure requirements
improve storm water drainage to avoid flooding and sewage
treatment plant overflows.
Land use ordinances control
vegetation to reduce fire risks. Building codes that require stilts
in flood-prone areas, limit uses on ground-floor levels, or require
weatherproofing reduce storm damage.
Retreat is the most controversial response to climate impacts.
Residents and local governments are loathe to relinquish settled
22. Robert R.M. Verchick & Joel D. Scheraga, Protectingthe Coast, in THE
LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS
235, 239 (Michael B. Gerrard & Katrina Fischer Kuh, eds., 2012); Megan M.
Herzog & Sean Hecht, Combating Sea-Level Rise in Southern California-How
Local Governments Can Seize Adaptation Opportunities While Minimizing
Legal Risk, 19 HASTINGS W. NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 463, 472-77 (2013).
23. See generally Jessica Grannis, Adaptation Tool Kit: Sea-Level Rise and
Coastal Land Use, GEORGETOWN CLIMATE CENTER 2-3 (2011), available at
http://www.georgetownclimate.org/sites/default/files/AdaptationToolKit_
SLR.pdf (listing mechanisms for controlling development to enhance shoreline
buffers); see also Anne Siders, Managed Coastal Retreat: A Legal Handbook on
Shifting Development Away from Vulnerable Areas, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL
CENTER
FOR
CLIMATE
CHANGE
5-7
(2013),
available
at
https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/cimatechange/files/Publications/ManagedCoastalRetreatFINAL_Oct%2030.pdf
(providing a list of tools for coastal management); Verchick & Scheraga,
Protecting the Coast, in THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra
note 22, at 239 (discussing potential "sofe' and "hard" measures for
maintaining shorelines).
24. See generally Grannis, supra note 23, at 5-15 (introducing a variety of
tools available to policymakers and providing a framework for analyzing their
respective strengths and weaknesses); see also J. Cullen Howe, Buildings, in
THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 22, at 209
(describing building code provisions for the design, construction, and operation
of buildings to address the impacts of climate change).
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neighborhoods. Nonetheless, increasing risk exposure and the cost
and fallibility of protection and accommodation measures suggest
that, ultimately, for some areas, retreat is the only feasible and
financially affordable option.25
Some retreat may occur without government intervention. As
disasters recur, people move away on their own, as occurred to
some degree in the New Orleans area after Hurricane Katrina. 26
Combined public and private measures also influence retreat: riskbased premium rates for flood insurance through the National
Flood Insurance Program could indirectly engender some retreat
from at-risk areas. 27 In addition to these private market and
public/private mechanisms, however, direct land use measures
that encourage retreat will be necessary to protect vulnerable
populations. 28 The most controversial land use approach to
disasters is organized retreat from disaster-prone areas like
floodplains. Numerous land use measures could facilitate such
retreat, including public purchase through eminent domain, limits
on post-disaster re-building, or the imposition of rolling
conservation easements that ultimately preclude habitation. 29
25. See Siders, supra note 23, at 2 (asserting policy makers will eventually
be forced to use managed retreat to avoid disasters); Lisa Grow Sun, Smart
Growth in Dumb Places: Sustainability, Disaster, and the Future of the
American City, 2011 B.Y.U. L. REV. 2157, 2160 (2011).
26. Campbell Robertson, Smaller New Orleans after Katrina, Census
at
available
2011),
3,
(Feb.
N.Y
TIMES
Shows,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/04/us/04census.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0.
27. High insurance premiums could have a significant impact on housing
because those who cannot afford (or choose not to pay for) the insurance will
have difficulty obtaining a mortgage, because properties in flood zones must
have flood insurance to obtain federally-guaranteed mortgages. Siders, supra
note 23, at 9-10. Risk-based premiums are not yet a reality; 2012 legislation
to increase NFIP premiums to better reflect actual risk were rolled back in
2014. Deborah Barfield Berry & Ledyard King, House passes flood insurance
at
available
4,
2014),
(Mar.
TODAY
bill,
USA
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/03/04/house-passes-floodinsurance-bill/6037775/.
28. Exclusive reliance on rising flood insurance rates to control at-risk
development will be insufficient. The NFIP requires flood insurance to obtain
a mortgage, but has no impact on long-standing homeowners without
mortgages. Moreover, some states may attempt to bypass the federal flood
insurance program, providing alternative sources of insurance that undercut
the retreat incentives created by the federal program. See Siders, supra note
23, at 12 (noting that increasing federal premiums will create pressure for
subnational flood insurance subsidies). In general, as disaster risks lower the
price of housing in at-risk areas, and to the extent flood insurance premiums
do not keep them out, poor and minority populations may be more likely to
move to at-risk areas due to their need for affordable housing,
notwithstanding the greater risk. Alice Kaswan, Domestic Climate Change
Adaptation and Equity, 42 ENVTL. L. REPORTER 11125, 11139 (2012). Thus,
government programs to achieve retreat may be necessary.
29. See Grannis, supra note 23 (describing different land use tools that can
be used to encourage retreat from at-risk coastal areas); Siders, supra note 23;
J. Peter Byrne & J. Grannis, Coastal Retreat Measures, in THE LAW OF
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Land use law also plays a critical role in avoiding indirect
disaster harms. When landfills, hazardous waste sites, sewage
treatment plants, and industry are flooded or subject to wildfires,
they create significant risks of indirect harm. 30 Examples abound.
Hurricane Katrina's floodwaters contained high levels of bacterial
contamination, and numerous hazardous waste sites and
industries were in the flood path.31 In fall 2013, Colorado floods
similarly led to high levels of bacterial contamination.3 2 A 2011
wildfire threatened the Los Alamos National Laboratory, a
national center for nuclear weapons research. Land use laws
control the siting of hazardous land uses and the flood or fire
protections such facilities must adopt.
2. Land Use Law and FutureMigration Shifts
When land use rules or the operation of the free market result
in "retreat" from at-risk or increasingly inhospitable
neighborhoods or regions, the challenge is not only how to depopulate, but also how to accommodate those who have been
displaced. Internal migration will occur as people leave at-risk
seashores, floodplains, heat-stressed areas, and agricultural areas
rendered unproductive because of drought or other climate
impacts.3 3 In other words, climate change could create significant
housing demand in areas that are relatively unscathed by climate
change. Land use laws will play a critical role in responding to
that demand. Although the private market will likely generate
sufficient supply of high-end housing, chronic shortages of
affordable housing are likely to become more severe. 34
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 22, at 267.
30. Draft Third Assessment, supra note 6, at 346-47; ROBERT R. M.
VERCHICK, FACING CATASTROPHE: ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION FOR A POSTKATRINA WORLD 59 (2010).

31. Leslie Fields, et al., Katrina's Wake: Arsenic-Laced Schools and
Playgrounds Put New Orleans Children at Risk, NATURAL RESOURCES
DEFENSE

COUNCIL

19

(2007),

available

at

http://www.nrdc.org/health/effects/wake/contents.asp; Dina Cappiello; Report
finds "sobering" impacts on environment, HOuS. CHRON. (Sept. 15, 2005),
available at http://www.chron.com/news/hurricanes/article/Report-findssobering-impact-on-environment-1668834.php. In 2009, southeastern floods
compromised a sewage treatment plant in Atlanta, Georgia, leading to
discharges of raw sewage. Draft Third Assessment, supra, note 6, at 123.
32. E. coli found in Colorado flood zones, but no oil, gas contamination,
THE
DENVER
POST
(Oct.
8,
2013),
available
at
http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_24264793/e-coli-found-coloradoflood-zones-but-no. About 40,000 gallons of oil spilled from the state's many
oil and gas operations, but oil contamination was not detected in state
sampling. Id.
33. Robin Kundis Craig, "Stationarity is Dead" - Long Live
Transformation: Five Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34
HARv. ENVTL L. REV. 9, 55 (2010).
34. See Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Toward a Policy of Heterogeneity: Overcoming
A Long History of Socioeconomic Segregation in Housing, 42 WAKE FOREST L.
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International immigration is also possible in light of predicted
severe international climate impacts, including flooding of small
island states, coastal flooding in Asia and Africa, and African
drought.35 Experts estimate there could be 200 million climate
migrants by 2050.36 Although international law does not recognize
most climate migrants as refugees entitled to international
assistance, 37 international treaties obliging countries to absorb
climate-related migration are a future possibility.
3. Land Use Law and Heat, Water, and EndangeredSpecies
Land use law plays a role not only in mitigating disasters and
addressing migration-induced housing pressures, but in many
other contexts as well. Urban design elements and building codes
significantly influence the "urban heat island" effect. 38
Appropriate design and building standards provide low-emission
mechanisms for adapting to higher temperatures. 39 As water
scarcity increases throughout much of the west, land use
regulation could enhance water conservation through landscaping
measures. Land use law could also facilitate endangered species
preservation and migration through conservation easements or the
creation of migration corridors through inhabited areas. 40

REV. 459, 497-98 (2007) (describing existing affordable housing deficit).
35. Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, IPCC 935 (2007), available at
http://www.ipec.chlipccreports/tar/wg2/index.htm (describing risks to small
island states); see id. at 330-34 (describing Asian and African flood risks); see
also id. at Executive Summary (describing drought risk in Africa).
36. Adapting to the Impacts of Climate Change, supra note 2, at 31.
Though conceding great uncertainty, the International Organization for
Migration (IOM) notes that estimates of environmentally-induced global
migration (both within and between countries) vary from 25 million to 1
billion, "with 200 million being the most widely cited estimate." Migration,
Climate Change and the Environment, IOM (Aug. 10, 2013), available at
http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/what-we-do/migration-and-climatechange/a-complex-nexus.html#estimates.
37. Forced Displacement in the Context of Climate Change: Challenges for
States under InternationalLaw, OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
REFUGEES, 10 (2009), availableat http://www.unher.org/4ale4d8c2.html.
38. Urban environments are often several degrees warmer than less
densely populated areas. See BRIAN STONE JR., THE CITY AND THE COMING
CLIMATE: CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE PLACES WE LIVE 75-76 (2012) (explaining
how urban areas' decreased vegetation, dark surfaces that absorb heat,
reflected heat from tall buildings, and localized heat from combustion sources
contribute to the urban heat island effect).
39. Careful design can reduce the heat island effect. Adapting to the
Impacts of Climate Change, supra note 2, at 70; Blake Hudson, Reconstituting
Land-Use Federalism to Address Transitory and Perpetual Disasters: The
BiModal FederalismFramework, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1991, 2007-08 (2011).
40. See generally J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species
Act: Building Bridges to the No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2008)
(describing climate change impacts on endangered species).
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THE STATE OF THE ART

Federal, state, and local governments have not stood still in
the face of climate threats. On-going federal disaster, housing,
and infrastructure programs regularly impact land uses in ways
relevant to adaptation.
State and local governments have
addressed disaster risks and begun exploring, if not implementing,
adaptation-related land use measures. While a full survey of all
federal, state, and local programs is beyond the scope of this essay,
a brief survey, and assessment of their sufficiency in meeting the
nation's land use-related adaptation needs, is provided.
A. FederalInitiatives
Congress has not passed comprehensive climate change
legislation addressing either mitigation or adaptation.
Nonetheless, federal agencies are pursuing adaptation-related
initiatives under existing legal authorities, efforts that were
initially coordinated by an interagency Adaptation Task Force. 41
These federal initiatives were endorsed by President Obama in his
June 2013 Climate Action Plan, 42 and were further refined and
restructured through a November 2013 Executive Order on
adaptation. 43
Within the limitations of existing laws and
mandates, these initiatives provide overarching principles,
41. See Progress Report of the Interagency Climate Change Adaptation
Task Force: Recommended Actions in Support of a National Climate Change
Adaptation Strategy, THE WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL

ON ENVIRONMENTAL

QUALITY
(Oct.
5,
2010),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/InteragencyClimate-Change-Adaptation-Progress-Report.pdf
(describing
federal
initiatives); see also Progress Report of the Interagency Climate Change
Adaptation Task Force, FEDERAL ACTIONS FOR A CLIMATE RESILIENT NATION

(Oct.
28,
2011),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/201 1adaptation
progress._report.pdf (describing federal initiatives). See generally Robert R.M.
Verchick & Abby Hall, Adapting to Climate Change while Planning for
Disaster: Footholds, Rope Lines, and the Iowa Floods, 2011 B.Y.U. L. REV.
2203, 2216-22 (2011) (discussing federal initiatives coordinated by the
Interagency Climate Change Adaptation Task Force).
42. The President's Climate Action Plan, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT,
(June
2013),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27scimateaction
plan.pdf.
43. Executive Order-Preparing the United States for the Impacts of
Climate Change, THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY (Nov. 1,
2013),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/1 1/01/executive-order-preparing-united-states-impacts-climatechange. The Executive Order replaces the interagency Adaptation Task Force
with a new Council on Climate Preparedness and Resilience. It also created a
State, Local, and Tribal Leaders Task Force on Climate Preparedness and
Resilience to provide a forum for subnational input into how the federal
government can help support adaptation.
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encourage inter-agency coordination, encourage the provision of
information and resources to a wide range of governmental and
private stakeholders (at all levels of government), and provide ongoing institutional structures for exchanging information about
climate impacts and potential adaptation responses. As important
as these coordinating efforts are, however, they primarily support
federal agency action. Although they explicitly demonstrate the
federal government's commitment to supporting state and local
efforts, they do not create a federal mandate for subnational
action.
In addition to these explicit and overarching adaptation
initiatives, individual federal programs indirectly implicate land
use and adaptation. The Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA)
already creates incentivizes for coastal land use planning and
NOAA, the agency that
coastal management programs.44
administers the CZMA, provides states with adaptation planning
resources. 45 Although the CZMA recognizes the risk of rising sea
levels and encourages states to engage in adaptation planning, the
CZMA does not require state and local governments in vulnerable
coastal areas to plan for sea-level rise, establish clear and precise
goals for state adaptation planning, nor directly require coastal
states to engage in adaptation planning. 46 NOAA and the Coastal
States Organization have advocated, without success, for CZMA
reauthorizations that would provide more explicit climate change
planning directives. 47
The federal government affects disaster-related components
of land use through several programs, including the National
44. 16 U.S.C. § § 1451 et seq. Federal incentives for local coastal land use
planning include federal funding and a "consistency" requirement that federal
projects be consistent with local coastal plans. See TIMOTHY BEATLEY, DAVID
J. BROWER, & ANNA K. SCHWAB, AN INTRODUCTION TO COASTAL ZONE
MANAGEMENT, 102-06 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing federal incentives for coastal
planning).
45. Coastal Climate Adaptation: Resources, NOAA, available at
(last visited
http://collaborate.csc.noaa.gov/climateadaptation/default.aspx
Dec. 26, 2013).
46. See Byrne & Grannis, Coastal Retreat Measures, in THE LAW OF
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 22, at 289-90 (stating that the
CZMA contains broad objectives for both preserving and developing the coast,
a mix of objectives that do not provide coastal states with a clear directive to
engage in adaptation planning).
47. The Role of Coastal Zone Management Programs in Adaptation to
Climate Change: Second Annual Report of the Coastal States Organization's
Climate Change Work Group, COASTAL STATES ORGANIZATION (Sept. 2007),
available at http://www.coastalstates.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/CSO2008-Climate-Change-Report2.pdf. Efforts to reauthorize the CZMA to more
explicitly require and direct planning for climate change have, to date, stalled
in legislative committees. Coastal State Climate Change Planning Act, H.R.
Rep. No. 1905, 111th Cong. (1st Sess.); Coastal State Climate Change
Planning Act, H.R. Rep. No. 4314, 112th Cong. (2d Sess.); Coastal State
Climate Change Planning Act, H.R. Rep. No. 764, 113th Cong. (1st Sess.).
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Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) as well as through disaster
preparedness and planning programs. By providing subsidized
flood insurance only within communities that adopt local
floodplain management plans and building construction
requirements, the NFIP provides some incentive for local
governments with land in designated floodplains to adopt land use
measures.4 8 Although an attractive tool in theory, some argue
that the program's subsidized insurance rates and outdated
floodplain maps have fostered development in at-risk areas that
would not have been developed absent the federal insurance
program.49 Additionally, analysts argue that, even where adopted,
local governments' floodplain management requirements have not
offered sufficient protections against the unavoidable and
increasing risks posed by floodplain development.5 0
2012
amendments to the NFIP to address some of these weaknesses
were weakened in 2014,51 and the NFIP will not provide a
sufficient federal mechanism for promoting local land use
adaptation.
Federal disaster laws, including the Stafford Act and the
Disaster Mitigation Act, provide federal funding for local and state
government disaster mitigation planning. 52
In addition to
funding, incentives to engage in planning include conditioning
non-emergency disaster relief on the completion of disaster

48. Siders, supra note 23, at 9. Without flood insurance, many buyers
could not obtain a mortgage because the federal government will not back
mortgages in flood-prone areas without flood insurance. Byrne & Granmis,
Coastal Retreat Measures, in THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE,

supra note 22, at 291.
49. Id. at 291-92; see also Sean B. Hecht, Insurance, in THE LAW OF
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 22, at 511, 518 (observing that

offering subsidized insurance, even if conditioned on weather-proofing, could
foster rather than inhibit development in risk-prone areas); see also id. at 52831 (describing numerous NFIP weaknesses).
50. See Siders, supra note 23, at 9 (observing that local planning did not
prevent damage and that many homes were not built to NFIP standards).
51. Siders, supra note 23, at 10; see also Hecht, Insurance, in THE LAW OF
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 22, at 529 (describing the 2012

amendments); see additionally Berry & King, supra note 27 (discussing
legislation repealing portions of the 2012 amendments).
52. Victor B. Flatt, Domestic DisasterPreparednessand Response, in THE
LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 22, at 481; see generally

John R. Nolan, Disaster Mitigation Through Land Use Strategies, 23 PACE
ENvTL L. REV. 959 (2006) (describing how land use planning can reduce
disaster risks); Patricia E. Salkin, Sustainabilityat the Edge: The Opportunity
and Responsibility of Local Governments to Most Effectively Plan for Natural
Disaster Mitigation, 38 ENVTL. L. REPORTER 10158, 10159 (2008).

The

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provides grants to state,
local, and tribal governments for disaster mitigation, including post-disaster,
pre-disaster, and to reduce long-term flood risks.
Hazard Mitigation
Assistance, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/hazard-mitigation-assistance (last
visited Dec. 26, 2013).
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mitigation plans 53 as well as conditioning some funding for
disaster mitigation measures on plan completion. 54 However,
although FEMA, the overseeing agency, has expressed its intent to
incorporate climate change adaptation into all of its programs,5 5 to
date, FEMA regulations do not require states to address climate
change in their hazard mitigation plans,56 and FEMA does not yet
mention climate change in the rules guiding its review of state
hazard mitigation plans.5 7 A recent study reveals that only eleven
states fully integrate climate change impacts into their disaster
assessments and mitigation strategies.58 Additionally, eighteen
states have little or very poor discussion of climate change or,
where they mention climate change, they do so in an unclear
manner.59 Finally, eleven states include only minimal discussion
of the full range of risks, including several facing substantial risks,
like Arizona, Louisiana, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia.6 0
Moreover, commentators have observed that mitigation planning
is often not integrated into comprehensive local land use
planning,6 ' and is therefore less likely to influence difficult local
land use choices.
Other agencies have addressed climate change in particular
programs, though none create a systematic, federal requirement
for localized land use related adaptation planning or programs.
For example, the Department of Housing and Urban Development
has addressed future climate change in its authority over federal
funding for post-Hurricane Sandy rebuilding.62 More broadly, the
53. Multi-Hazard Mitigation Planning,FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/multihazard-mitigation-planning (last visited Dec. 26, 2013).
54. The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 encourages local and state disaster
planning by conditioning funding for hazard mitigation grants on the
development of state and local disaster mitigation plans. See Flatt, Domestic
DisasterPreparednessand Response, in THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE
CHANGE, supra note 22, at 486 (discussing incentives created by the Disaster
Mitigation Act of 2000); Nolan, supra note 52, at 965.
55. See FEMA Climate Change Policy Statement, FEMA (2012), available
http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1919-25045at
6267/signedcimateschangepolicy-statement.pdf.
56. Matthew Babcock, State Hazard Mitigation Plansand Climate Change:
Rating the States, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL CENTER FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAw
(Nov. 2013), http://web.law.columbia.edulsites/default/files/microsites/cimatechange/files/Publications/Students/SHMP%20SurveyFinal.pdf.
57. Id. at 3.
58. Id. at 10-11.
59. Id. at 8. Some of these states, like Alabama, Georgia, and Delaware,
face substantial climate risks.
60. Id. at 8-9. Ten states include accurate discussion that remains too
limited. Id. at 9-10.
61. Salkin, supra note 52, at 109159.
62. A Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force developed guidelines for
federal disaster relief that explicitly noted the importance of rebuilding to
enhance resilience. Fact Sheet: Key Recommendations to Guide the Continued
Federal Investment in the Region, HURRICANE SANDY REBUILDING TASK
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Department of Transportation and the Environmental Protection
Agency have indirectly impacted local land use through
A more
infrastructure planning and funding decisions.63
comprehensive effort to link environmental, housing, and
infrastructure planning has been initiated through the
Sustainable Communities Initiative jointly administered by HUD,
EPA, and DOT. 64 Although a valuable program, its grants are
project-specific and are not designed to require or achieve
comprehensive adaptation planning and implementation. Lastly,
the Army Corps of Engineers' dam, levee, and wetland decisions
all have significant impacts on local land use conditions. However,
there is no explicit mechanism for ensuring that these decisions
take climate change into account 65 and, even if they did, they are
not coordinated with state or local land use planning.
Therefore, although many federal programs implicate land
use and could implicate adaptation, most do not explicitly require
attention to climate change. Federal programs provide support
and grant funding, but they do not mandate action. There is no
systematic mechanism for ensuring that local and state
at
available
FORCE,
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=r
ja&ved=OCCsQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fportal.hud.gov%2Fhudportal%2F
documents%2Fhuddoc%3Fid%3Dhsrebuildingstrategy.pdf&ei=C2npUpKAHM
mfrAHU7ICwCA&usg-AFQjCNEzqaftuxpRZ-EMdQqlrdpCcAs a condition for distributing
slA&sig2=rNSdjMV0EXAYhKpyywvKOg.
infrastructure funding in November 2013, HUD required grant applicants to
assess how climate change could impact the proposed project, and HUD may
extend this approach in other funding contexts. Ethan I. Strell, Second Round
of Sandy Relief Money Conditioned on Future Sea Level Rise Risk Analysis,
CLIMATE
LAW
BLOG
(Nov.
25,
2013),
http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2013/11/25/second-round-ofsandy-relief-money-conditioned-on-future-sea-level-rise-risk-analysis/.
63. Transportation and Climate Change Clearinghouse, Climate Change
DEPARTMENT
OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Impacts & Adaptation, U.S.
http://climate.dot.gov/impacts-adaptations/index.html (last visited Feb. 27,
2014). Sewage treatment facilities face significant threats of increased
overflows where storm and sanitary sewers are combined. EPA is exploring
the value of land use mechanisms, including permeable landscaping, to reduce
Why Green
stormwater flow and reduce the risk of sewage overflows.
Infrastructure?
EPA,
http://water.epa.gov/infrastructure/greeninfrastructure/gi.why.cfm#WaterQua
lity (last visited Dec. 26, 2013); John Nolan, Katrina'sLament: Reconstructing
Federalism,23 PACE ENV'L L. REV. 987, 1007 (2006).
64. See Sustainable Communities Initiative, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOUSING
AND
URBAN
DEVELOPMENT,
available
at
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/hudprograms/sci (last visited July
31, 2013) (providing information on the Sustainable Communities Initiative);
see also Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Land Law Federalism, 61 EMORY L.J. 1397,
1428 (2012) (describing the interagency partnership and its goals).
65. See generally Victor Beyers Flatt and Jeremy M. Tarr, Adaptation,
Legal Resilience, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: Managing Water
Supply in a Climate-Altered World, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1499, 1545-48 (discussing
need for Army Corps of Engineers to address climate change).
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governments engage in comprehensive adaptation related-land use
planning.6 6
B. State and Local Government Initiatives
Where systemic adaptation planning has occurred, state and
As of
local governments have been the primary drivers.67
December 2013, twelve states have completed adaptation plans
and three states have plans in progress.6 8 Many, but not all, are
coastal states facing the most evident risks of sea level rise and
increased storm intensity.69
Many local governments are national leaders in developing
Chicago had one of the first
climate adaptation plans.7 0
adaptation plans in a major U.S. city, a plan including land use
elements that reduce urban heat, pollution, and flooding.7 ' In
2013, New York City released a $20 billion dollar plan to protect
the city from the kind of devastation wreaked by Hurricane Sandy
in fall 2012.72
Overall, however, planning and implementation are not
comprehensive. Many state and local governments have not
engaged in systematic adaptation planning, 73 and where plans
66. Cf. Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The Structure of the Land Use
Regulatory System in the United States, 22 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 441, 487,
490-91 (2007) (describing how federal and state influence over local land use
operates as a fragmented overlay on local control and is not coherent or
comprehensive).
67. Arroyo & Cruz, State and Local Adaptation, in THE LAW OF
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 22, at 569-87; see also State and
Local Adaptation Plans, GEORGETOWN CLIMATE CENTER, available at

http://www.georgetowncimate.org/adaptation/state-and-local-plans
(last
visited Dec. 31, 2013); see also Local Governments, Extreme Weather, and
Climate Change 2012, ICLEI-LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR SUSTAINABILITY USA,
available at http://www.icleiusa.org/action-center/learn-from-others/localgovernments-extreme-weather-and-cimate-change-2012 (last visited Feb. 22,
2014) (detailing actions taken by 20 U.S. cities).
68. Arroyo & Cruz, State and Local Adaptation, in THE LAW OF
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 22, at 569-87.

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Chicago Climate Action Plan: Adaptation (Feb. 15, 2013),
http://www.chicagocimateaction.org/pages/adaptation/ll1.php
(summarizing
Chicago's adaptation strategies).
72. Climate Change Adaptation in New York City: Building a Risk
Management Response, NEW YORK CITY PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (May
2010),
available
at
http://www.nyas.org/publications/annals/Detail.aspx?cid=ab9df9f-1cbl-4f21b0c8-7607daa5dfec; Plan NYC: A Stronger More Resilient New York, THE CITY
OF
NEW
YORK
(June
11,
2013),
available
at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/sirr/html/report/report.shtml.
73. Arroyo & Cruz, State and Local Adaptation, in THE LAW OF
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 22, at 593. The fate of North
Carolina's efforts to address sea level rise provides a cautionary tale about full
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have been adopted, they often lack specific implementation
measures. 74 Instead of recognizing climate risks, many local
governments are encouraging rather than discouraging
development in vulnerable floodplains. 75 In general, they face a
lack of data, a lack of money, and a lack of political commitment by
local government and business leaders.76 Unless a direct and
certain threat is imminent, it is difficult for state and local
policymakers to commit the financial and political capital
necessary to initiate controversial changes to the land use status
quo.77 Moreover, local governments are reluctant to forego or
curtail the short-term tax revenue and civic benefits that
development offers.78

Ultimately, existing land use provisions to adapt to climate
change are not sufficient.
As noted above, there is no
comprehensive approach to land use at the federal level, and
existing federal initiatives are fragmented and are not adequately
integrated with each other or with state and local land use

reliance on state authority. Based on an extensive 2010 report, a state science
panel had established a statewide sea level rise prediction that would have
been useful to local government land use planning. However, in 2012, the
legislature reacted by preventing the agency from providing a statewide
prediction until 2016, depriving local governments of the state's expertise on
predicted sea level rise. See Siders, supra note 23, at 32-33 (describing North
Carolina experience).
74. See Joann Carmin et al., Progress and Challenges in Urban Climate
Adaptation Planning: Results of a Global Survey, MIT (2012), available at
http://web.mit.edu/jcarmin/www/urbanadapt/Urban%20Adaptation%2OReport
%20FINAL.pdf (describing factors that have impeded local government
adaptation efforts); Arroyo & Cruz, State and Local Adaption, in THE LAW OF
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 22, at 593. Compared globally,
U.S. cities had the lowest level of adaptation assessment and planning (59%).
Carmin, et al., supra at 74. Even in areas likely to experience significant
impacts, like southern California, most local governments have done little to
plan for likely increases in sea level. See Herzog & Hecht, supra note 22, at
471 (describing lack of attention to sea level rise in many southern California
communities).
75. See Hudson, supra note 39, at 2002 (describing local governments'
encouragement of floodplain development).
76. See Carmin et al., supra note 74, at 23-24 (stating that in a recent
survey, less than 25% of U.S. cities indicated that their local government
officials strongly supported adaptation planning). See also Siders, supra note
23, at 27 (observing that many local governments lack the commitment,
resources, and technical knowledge to develop coastal adaptation plans).
77. See Hudson, supra note 39, at 2027 n.178 (arguing that disaster risks
often appear remote and speculative).
Cf. Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing
Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REv. 570, 598-99, 631-33, and 637
(Dec. 1996) (observing that politicians often respond more to immediate
concerns and are less responsive to as-yet intangible and distant harm).
78. See Hecht, Insurance, in THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE
CHANGE, supra note 22, at 518 (observing that "[1]ocal governments typically
promote property development and do not want to make choices that
jeopardize the value of property.").
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planning initiatives.7 9 While some state and local governments
have taken great strides, many have not, leaving significant
populations exposed to potentially devastating harm.
Reliance on piecemeal federal, state, and local efforts will be
insufficient to achieve an adequate, collective response to climate
change. Federal leadership is necessary. A key governance
challenge is identifying how the federal government can help
direct a cohesive -

or at least more cohesive - multilevel

governance approach that integrates appropriate roles for federal,
state, regional, and local control over land use-related adaptation
measures.
IV. FEDERAL FUNCTIONS WITHIN A MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE
STRUCTURE

Multilevel governance structures seek to take advantage of
the strengths of differing jurisdictional levels, avoid their
weaknesses, and reap the benefits of dynamic and overlapping
This essay identifies key land use governance
authority.80
functions and suggests ways in which the federal government
could play a more vital and supportive role to state and local
governments.
The first section focuses on the fundamental building blocks:
climate impact assessments and adaptation planning. It reviews
the arguments for retaining a strong local role and explores the
limits of exclusive reliance on local initiative. It then suggests a
multilevel structure that includes a clear, federal requirement for
assessment and planning. Substantively, the essay suggests that,
while substantial discretionary authority must remain with local
governments, federal planning requirements should also dictate
certain minimum planning and program parameters. The second
section addresses several practical functions the federal
government could perform to support state and local action. These
functions include the provision of financial and informational
resources, as well as coordination of the multiplicity of federal,
state, regional, and local efforts among multiple agencies.
This essay does not advance a specific one-stop proposal.
Instead, it seeks to further the debate by identifying the specific
kinds of functions that the federal government could play in
79. See Adapting to the Impacts of Climate Change, supra note 2, at 11
(finding that existing adaptation efforts "are not well coordinated" and could
lead to unintended consequences and inefficient responses); see also Verchick
& Hall, supra note 41, at 2223 (describing lack of coordination between local
and federal agencies and lack of focused federal attention to adaptation).
80. See Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local
Collaborationin an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 1014 (2007)
(observing that cooperative regimes that share power among multiple levels of
government temper the drawbacks to decentralized power while still allowing
the benefits of decentralization).
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enhancing the
nation's response
to climate change.
Comprehensive federal adaptation legislation may be necessary to
realize the ideal degree of land use related adaptation planning.
However, recognizing the challenge of adopting such legislation,
this articulation of appropriate functions could occur through
existing programs, like disaster planning or coastal planning
programs, or be realized through modest legislative or
administrative revisions to existing authority.
A FederalRequirement for SubnationalAdaptation Risk
Assessments and Land Use Planning
As a threshold matter, climate risk assessments and land use
planning to respond to identified risks will be essential to effective
adaptation. Although climate risk assessments are subject to
inevitable uncertainty, 8 ' there is little doubt that climate change is
occurring. Therefore, some assessment of potential impacts,
however uncertain, is more accurate than assuming that the
status quo will prevail.
Climate risk assessments will be of little value if they do not
translate into planning effective and thoughtful responses. Given
the importance of land use to adaptation, climate risk information
needs to be translated into land-use plans, land-use measures, and
building code measures that are integrated with local, regional,
and state government land-use planning measures.
What, then, is the federal role in ensuring that such risk
assessments and planning occur? As elaborated below, actual
assessments and planning need to occur at a subnational level,
likely with elements that are statewide, regional, and local.
However, because many local, regional, and state governments are
not engaging in such planning, the federal government could play
a key role by establishing risk assessment and planning
requirements as well as by creating a framework that facilitates
and ensures adequate subnational efforts. 82
1. The Importance of SubnationalAssessment and Planning
National risk assessments, like those done by the U.S. Global
Change Research Program, are useful in identifying broad
national and regional climate impact trends. However, they
cannot identify the on-the-ground local impacts faced by particular
communities and metropolitan areas.83 Because local or regional
81. See Adapting to the Impacts of Climate Change, supra note 2, at 54-55
(stating that assessments are inevitably uncertain); Alejandro E. Camacho,
Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing Uncertainty through a
LearningInfrastructure,59 EMORY L.J. 1, 14-15 (2009).
82. See Siders, supra note 23, at ii (observing that adaptation planning is
needed at all levels of government).
83. See Adapting to the Impacts of Climate Change, supra note 2, at 55
(observing the local nature of many climate change impacts and response
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governments have localized knowledge, they can design tailored
responses to localized impacts.84 Moreover, in the land useplanning context, local or regional communities ultimately must
consider and choose among adaptation measures. Local and
regional governments can often best perceive the tradeoffs posed
by adaptation measures, and best weigh the benefits of reducing
risk, the economic implications of changes to local land use
patterns, and the tradeoffs among alternative mechanisms.
More specifically, in the disaster preparation context, local
governments can weigh the various mechanisms and attributes of
protection, accommodation, and retreat. They are in the best
position to make collective choices about urban design that
influence both environmental sustainability and quality of life
more generally. The fundamental community features affected by
land use decisions are of great import to local citizens.85
Additionally, as a practical matter, the federal government does
not have the resources to develop location-specific land use plans
around the country.86
Decentralized subnational planning also provides another
classic benefit of local control: the proverbial laboratories of
innovation. Although different areas of the country will encounter
different circumstances, requiring differing approaches, there will
be commonalities. Consequently, one area's experiment could
provide important lessons for other areas experiencing similar
circumstances. Lastly, the consequences of a failed local initiative
would be less widespread than the failure of a monolithic federal
approach.8 7
In addition, small-scale decision-making offers participatory
advantages.8 8 Citizens can easily access hearings and other
measures); See also Daniel Farber, Climate Adaptation and Federalism:
Mapping the Issues, 1 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 259, 260 (2009)
(noting that "[sitate and local governments are in some ways the natural'first
responders' to climate change.").
84. See generally William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the
Problem of Institutional Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 94 (Oct. 1999)
(describing local governments' superior understanding of local conditions).
85. See Sara C. Bronin, The Quiet Revolution Revived: Sustainable Design,
Land Use Regulation, and the States, 93 MINN. L. REV. 231, 239 (Nov. 2008)
(describing how land use rules affecting property fundamentally impact
personal autonomy interests).
86. Cf. Katherine A. Trisolini, All Hands on Deck: Local Governments and
the Potential for Bidirectional Climate Change Regulation, 62 STAN. L. REV.
669, 736 (Mar. 2010) (observing that the federal government could not manage
designing and implementing local climate mitigation measures around the
country).
87. See Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks
and Balance in the InterjurisdictionalGray Area, 66 MD L. REV. 503, 617
(2007) (describing how local control limits the risk associated with innovative
measures).
88. See, e.g., Bronin, supra note 85, at 239 (describing participatory
benefits of small-scale decision-making); see Ostrow, supra note 64, at 1442-
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decision-making settings, and local voices are less likely to be
diluted by large constituencies.89 Moreover, given their closer
proximity to the electorate and the risk that dissatisfied citizens
will "exit" a jurisdiction that fails to meet their preferences,90 local
planners and government officials could be more accountable for
their planning decisions.91
2. The Limits of Subnational Control and Benefits of a Federal
Role
Whatever the virtues of maintaining a vital local or
subnational role in conducting risk assessments and land use
planning, the federal government could serve a vital function by
ensuring that such assessments and planning in fact occur. 92 A
laissez-faire approach treating local or state inaction as "their
problem" that "they have to live with"93 will not suffice. Given the
scale of risks ahead, a federal judgment that all citizens deserve
the benefits of adaptation planning represents a legitimate
democratic decision, even if certain local governments would
prefer not to act.94
Federal risk assessment and adaptation planning
requirements are also justified by the pervasive extrajurisdictional consequences that could arise from local
governments' actions and inactions in the adaptation context. In
the federalism literature, extra-jurisdictional impacts frequently
justify federal minimum standards.9 5
In a few instances, certain local adaptation land use-related
measures, like municipal or private sea walls, could cause extra-

43; ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN 44 (2011).
89. Id. at 51-53.
90. Id. at 53-54.
91. See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 91-92 (1995) (stating
that local government officials are more immediately accountable).
92. Cf. Hudson, supra note 39, at 2050 (proposing a federal law requiring
state and local disaster mitigation planning).
93. See generally Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and
the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory
Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 23, 36-37 (1996) (stating "that local
governments ought to be allowed to make judgments about their own
interests, even if those judgments turn out to be misguided.").
94. See Robert L. Glicksman, Climate Change Adaptation: A Collective
Action Perspective on Federalism Considerations, 40 ENVTL. L. 1159, 1193
(2010) (suggesting that the federal government should provide minimal
protections in case state and local governments are reluctant to act); see also
Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National
Neurosis, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 903, 948-49 (Apr. 1994) (describing democratic
legitimacy of national-level decision-making).
95. SHAPIRO, supra note 91, at 40-42; Esty, supra note 77, at 587.
Professor Ostrow observes that extra jurisdictional impacts have been one of
the most critical factors explaining the extension of federal control in a
multiplicity of contexts. Ostrow, supra note 64, at 1408-20; 1421, 1438.
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jurisdictional impacts, like beach erosion, in neighboring areas.96
More importantly, a local, regional, or state government's inaction,
like the failure to assess and plan for climate change impacts,
could have significant consequences on neighboring jurisdictions
and taxpayers more broadly, particularly in the disaster context.97
When local land use measures fail to address disaster risks and
extensive damage ensues, the federal government ends up
providing billions of dollars in disaster relief.98 Between 2011 and
2013, Congress authorized $136 billion in disaster relief,99 $50
billion of which responded to Hurricane Sandy's widespread
damage to the mid-Atlantic.100
Subnational governments' failure to assess and plan for
disasters can also lead to the loss of key infrastructure services,
severely impacting surrounding areas. Damage to ports can
interfere with national trade. Damage to transmission lines can
have widespread impacts on energy systems, and damage to
communication towers can have broadly felt impacts on national
communication networks.10 1 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, in
2005, temporarily shut down oil and natural gas production in the
Gulf of Mexico, the source of over 20 percent of U.S. supplies, and
significantly interfered with U.S. oil refining.102
Additionally, local decisions about floodplain development
have significant downstream impacts. Development that removes
wetlands and increases impervious surfaces can exacerbate
flooding risks. Local government decisions allowing development
in floodplains not only places those in the floodplains at risk, but
also has cumulative impacts on the riparian system, substantially
increasing the risk and severity of downstream flooding.103
Requiring local governments to assess flooding risks and develop
96. See Verchick & Scheraga, Protecting the Coast, in THE LAW OF
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 22, at 241 (discussing extrajurisdictional impacts of coastal armoring).
97. For example, Hurricane Katrina caused extensive external impacts
with large-scale ripple effects on surrounding jurisdictions. Ryan, supra note
87, at 591-93. Even Butler & Macey, who argue that the federal government
should not interfere with local decision-making even if it is misguided, state
deference to local decision-making is appropriate only "as long as the costs of
these [local] decisions are fully internalized by the particular communities
served by the local government." Butler & Macey, supranote 93, at 36-37.
98. Hudson, supra note 39, at 1996-98.
99. Siders, supra note 23, at 2.
100. See John Rudolph, Sandy Bill Passes Senate, Measure Heads to White
House for Obama Signature, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 28, 2013), available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/28/sandy-bill_n_2569312.html
(reporting that Senate passed a $51 billion aid package for Hurricane Sandy
victims).
101. See Draft Third Assessment, supra note 6, at 422.
102. Lawrence Kumins and Robert Bamberger, Oil and Gas Disruptionfrom
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 1 (Oct. 21, 2005),
available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/55824.pdf.
103. Farber, supranote 83, at 266; Glicksman, supra note 94, at 1184.
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land use measures to address them would help avoid indirect
harms to downstream communities.
Moreover, local disasters have widespread housing impacts,
both in the short and long-term. In the short-term, hurricane
Katrina forced 800,000 Louisiana residents to disperse throughout
the southeastern states and beyond. 104 In the long-term, disaster
evacuees may not choose to return to disaster prone areas,
particularly if they are renters without vested property
interests.1 05
To the degree local governments engage in
appropriate climate assessments and planning, they could
potentially reduce local vulnerability and the degree to which local
residents end up as disaster refugees. While less dramatic, local
governments' assessment and planning to address slower-moving
risks, like increasing heat or water scarcity, could help certain
areas maintain their sustainability and reduce migration to other
areas.
Moreover, subnational governments will be unable to handle
certain adaptation challenges because they occur on a larger scale.
In these instances, it is not simply that local governments trigger
extra-jurisdictional impacts. Instead, the problems transcend
local boundaries and cannot be adequately addressed by local
governments or by state governments acting alone.106
For
example, as parts of the country become uninhabitable due to sealevel rise, insufficient drinking water, or high temperatures,
internal migration will create housing pressure in less vulnerable
areas. The challenge is not just that local jurisdictions' failure to
address housing vulnerability causes extrajurisdictional impacts,
as noted above, but that climate change will generate housing
shifts that require larger-scale planning than local governments
can achieve. As another example, reducing the urban heat island
effect requires collective action on a metropolitan scale, action that
104. Draft Third Assessment, supranote 6, at 352.
105. See generally Farber, supra note 83, at 267 (describing risk of climate
refugees following large-scale related disasters).
106. See Draft Third Assessment, supra note 6, at 430 (describing inability
of local governments to address climate change impacts on their own). Many
climate impacts will occur at multiple scales simultaneously. See generally
David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism:The Case Against
Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796,
1814-15 (describing the multiple geographic and temporal scales of many
environmental problems). Professor Ryan observes that many modern policy
challenges, including environmental protection, national security, and
telecommunications, fall into an "interjurisdictional gray area" that cannot be
characterized as exclusively local, state, or federal. RYAN, supra note 88, at
145-80. See also William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A
Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IowA L. REV. 1, 13 (Oct. 2003) (observing that
"[g]lobal warming ... confronts no matching or commensurate political or
legal regime that, due to the regime's geographical turf, subject
responsibilities, or political constituency, is logically situated to take the lead
and address global warming's causes and anticipated harm.").
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is difficult to mobilize and coordinate where metropolitan areas
are fragmented into multiple municipal jurisdictions. Similarly,
infrastructure security requires coordinated action that extends
beyond municipal boundaries.
Nor do local governments necessarily ensure ideal
participatory opportunities; the ideal participatory structure
depends on the scale of the problem and the presence or absence of
extra-jurisdictional impacts. Local decision-making offers more
opportunities for direct citizen influence, but does not provide
participatory opportunities for all affected citizens. Citizens
impacted by extra-jurisdictional consequences have no voice in the
local decisions causing the impacts. 107 Larger-scale decisionmaking often better reflects the views of the full range of affected
Moreover, although localized decision-making may
citizens.
provide a voice to locally-unique perspectives, it can also
marginalize the voice of small groups within local settings. Some
interests, like minority or low-income residents, could find their
voices overwhelmed at a local level, but could wield more influence
when combined with others at larger jurisdictional levels. 08
Another classic justification for a federal role is that it would
help mitigate the "race to the bottom" that can arise when state
and local governments compete for development. The race to the
bottom could emerge if state or local governments fear that
important development restrictions or requirements, like
restrictions on floodplain development or strong building codes,
will jeopardize growth and economic development.1 09 These fears
could lead local governments to forego restrictions or requirements
they would otherwise have adopted. Requiring all jurisdictions to
adopt minimum restrictions could mitigate the race to the
bottom.110

107. JONATHAN LEVINE, ZONED OUT: REGULATION, MARKETS, AND CHOICES
IN TRANSPORTATION AND METROPOLITAN LAND-USE 42 (2006); see also
Davidson, supra note 80, at 1025 (observing that "majority preferences" are
defined as such only "by virtue of the line drawn around the locus of decisionmaking").
108. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 94, at 944-45.
109. See Edward L. Glaeser & Matthew Kahn, The Greenness of Cities,
HARVARD UNIVERSITY, JOHN F. KENNEDY, SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT 11 (Mar.
at
available
2008),
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/var/ezpsite/storage/fckeditor/file/pdfs/centersthat
(noting
programs/centers/taubman/policybriefs/greencities final.pdf
environmental land use measures could shift development to less-regulated
jurisdictions); Farber, supra note 83, at 267; Glicksman, supra note 94, at
1186; see e.g., Hudson, supra note 39, at 2002 (providing examples of local
jurisdictions' allowing (and facilitating) floodplain development due to fears
that they would otherwise lose economic development).
110. Cf. Hudson, supra note 39, at 2059 (stating that overarching land
development standards would help dampen the race-to-the bottom). These
minimum restrictions will counter the downward pressure on standards
created by competition. Id. They are nonetheless likely to be highly
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A federal role in establishing standards could also counter the
While local governments'
risk of interest group capture.
participatory and accountability advantages provide an argument
in favor of local control, the flip side of local access is the risk that
certain interest groups, like construction or real estate developers,
could wield substantial power that is difficult for local officials to
resist."' A federal role in setting minimum standards reduces the
risk that these groups would use their local influence to fight
adaptation-related land use controls. Of course, interest group
capture risks are present at all levels of government. Nonetheless,
one of the advantages of having federal minimum standards and
retaining the option for stricter local standards is that multiple
standard-setting opportunities reduce the risk of capture at any
one governance level.112
A federal role could also promote equitable adaptation, both
procedurally and substantively.
In the land use context,
adaptation planning requires difficult decisions about areas to
protect, mechanisms to accommodate risk, and decisions about
areas from which to retreat. The factors used to make such
determinations have deep socioeconomic consequences.
For
example, relying on land value as the primary metric to determine
what areas to protect versus abandon could systematically lead to
the protection of wealthier areas and the abandonment of poorer
areas."13 Even without a metric like land value, these decisions
will be politically charged, and create the risk that politically
powerful constituencies will fare better than more marginalized
populations. Civil rights concerns have pervaded post-disaster rebuilding debates in New Orleans and Texas.114 Throughout the
controversial because they will not eliminate much of the underlying concern
that drives down protective requirements: that economic development will go
to places facing less risk and therefore facing fewer requirements. Id.
Nonetheless, this shift is one that is necessary to direct new development into
safer areas and to ensure that development in less safe areas does not occur
without appropriate protections.
111. See Buzbee, supra note 84, at 80-84 (describing the powerful role of
transportation and real estate interests relative to citizens); see also Hudson,
supra note 39, at 2046 (quoting disaster scholar's observation that property
and building interests are likely to reduce the reliability of local governmentled disaster mitigation measures).
112. See Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, Functional
Government in 3-D: A Framework for Evaluating Allocations of Government
Authority, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 19, 52 (2014); Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing
the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J.
159, 178-79, 181 (2006).
113. See the Impacts of Sea-Level Rise on the California Coast, CALIFORNIA
ENERGY
COMMISSION
51
(2009),
available
at
http://www.energy.ca.gov/publications/displayOneReport.php?pubNum=CEC500-2009-024-F (observing that "what we choose to protect and how we pay for
it may have a disproportionate impact on low-income neighborhoods and
communities of color.").
114. See Mafruza Khan, RACE, PLACE, AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AFTER
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nation's civil rights history, the federal government has created
federal parameters to guide state and local action to respond to the
risk that state and local governments will slight the interests of
racially and economically marginalized populations. 15
3. The FederalRole
The discussion above suggests the need for a multigovernance
approach that combines a federal assessment and planning
requirement with subnational implementation.116 The federal
government could establish both an adaptation planning process
and certain minimum substantive standards. Although this essay
focuses on adaptation-related land use, such federal planning
requirements and standards could be equally appropriate in other
contexts impacted by climate change.
a. Federal Procedural Requirements
The central procedural requirement would be for the federal
government to require subnational climate impact assessments
and planning, including land use related planning. A critical and
unanswered question is the precise scale for such assessment and
planning. As a practical matter, at a minimum, state agencies
could serve as intermediaries responsible for overseeing integrated
state, regional, and local assessments and planning. Assessment
and planning at multiple scales is likely to be necessary, and the
states may be best positioned to determine the appropriate
allocation of responsibility and authority." 7 Ultimately, however,
HURRICANE KATRINA: STRUGGLES TO RECLAIM, REBUILD, AND REVITALIZE
NEW ORLEANS AND THE GULF COAST 205, 214 (Robert D. Bullard & Beverly

Wright eds., 2009) (describing how, post-Katrina, the local government
initially decided to retreat from low-lying areas historically occupied by
African American neighborhoods); see also Robbie Whelan, A Texas-Sized
Housing Fight, WALL
ST. J.,
(Aug. 3,
2012) available at
http://online.wsj.cominews/articles/SB1000087239639044354550457756327156
8716862 (describing racially charged resistance to re-building public housing
in Galveston, Texas damaged by a 2008 hurricane).
115. See SHAPIRO, supra note 91, at 52-55 (discussing states' disregard of
racial minorities' rights); see also Ryan, supra note 87, at 605 (noting the
federal government's role in defending civil rights denied by states).
116. See Ostrow, supra note 64, at 1436-37 (discussing the benefits of
shared federal-local power over land use that allows federal goals to be met
but utilizes local governments' capacity to tailor such policies to "local
geographic and economic conditions and community preferences"); see
generally RYAN, supra note 88, at 94-96 (describing arguments in favor of
cooperative federalism).
117. Several federal statutes, including the CZMA and the Disaster
Mitigation Act, incorporate state and local planning. See BEATLEY, supra note
44, at 102-106 (describing CZMA requirements for local planning); Flatt,
Domestic DisasterPreparedness,and Response, in THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO
CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 22, at 481 (describing Disaster Mitigation Act
planning requirements). Assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of
these existing federal planning requirements could provide useful guidance to
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any adaptation planning at state or regional levels must be
integrated with and incorporated into local land use decisionmaking.
Effective implementation will require oversight. Federal
review of local assessments and plans, or of state compilations of
local efforts, will be a necessary component.118 Federal review of
state and local initiatives is a common feature of multigovernance
approaches. Such review does entail some overlap and potential
inefficiency: federal oversight requires the expenditure of federal
resources on matters that have already been addressed at state
and local levels. 119 Nonetheless, one of the advantages of a
"dynamic federalism" structure that includes overlapping federal
and state roles is the additional accountability flowing from
federal oversight of state and local action, 120 as well as the policy
dynamism resulting from the interaction among jurisdictional
levels. 121
Additionally, the federal government could establish
minimum requirements to enhance meaningful participation by
historically marginalized groups in climate assessment and land
use planning processes.122 Local and state entities engaging in
planning could be required to assess the best mechanisms for
reaching all populations, including appropriate translation,
utilizing non-governmental organizations with the knowledge and
connections to reach all populations, and holding meetings at
times and in places that facilitate access. While participation does
not equal control, the federal government's minimum participation
standards could facilitate access and create greater accountability.
b. Substantive Federal Parameters
In addition to establishing a procedural requirement for
subnational assessment and planning, the federal government
should, to a limited extent, impose selective substantive standards
or parameters on state and local planning and land use related
the development of a structure for adaptation-related land use planning.
118. Such review need not be at the level of specificity and detail as
accompanies federal review of state implementation plans. See Clean Air Act
§ 110(k) (describing federal review of state implementation plans).
Nonetheless, federal review of state and local adaptation planning will need to
be robust enough to ensure that the assessments and planning initiatives are
not empty exercises.
119. Camacho & Glicksman, supra note 112, at 48.
120. Id. at 52.
121. See Engel, supra note 112, at 171-73 (describing the benefits of
dynamic federalism).
122. See Alice Kaswan, Domestic Climate Change Adaptation and Equity,
42 ENVTL. L. REP. 11125, 11141-42 (2012) (describing importance of
participatory processes to equitable adaptation); see generally Siders, supra
note 23, at 30 (describing the importance of community participation in
adaptation planning generally and in enhancing fairness and including
disadvantaged communities).
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adaptation measures. This essay provides broad contours for the
substantive standards that would be appropriate in light of the
federalism principles described above, and lays the groundwork for
policymakers to develop more detailed and context-specific
proposals.
First, federal rules could establish clear adaptation-related
goals that state and local plans must achieve, like limiting
development in areas that currently, or will in the future, face
high risks of property and environmental loss.123 Such clearly
stated goals would reduce extra-jurisdictional impacts, help local
governments overcome the race-to-the-bottom, resist pressures
from development interests, and help them resist their own shortterm incentives for increasing development. Additionally, the
federal government could eliminate support for development in
these high-risk areas.124
Second, federal assessment and planning requirements could
require local governments to acknowledge the external impacts of
local action and inaction. For example, in assessing disaster risk
from flooding, local governments could be required to assess their
capacity to absorb their own evacuees and, if their internal
capacity is limited, they could be required to assess the impact of
To the extent
evacuees on surrounding communities.
infrastructure, like ports, energy transmission, highways, and
communications systems are at risk, local governments could be
required to assess and address the external impacts of local
vulnerability.
Third, where federal or state assessments and planning
identify larger-scale needs and plans, federal law should provide a
mechanism for these larger-scale interests to be incorporated into
local planning and initiatives. For example, to the degree climate
change will prompt internal migration, national assessments of
projected shifts are necessary, and a national mechanism for
accommodating such migrations, if not a national housing plan,
will be needed. As such national planning proceeds, mechanisms
for translating that national planning into state and local land use
planning, particularly to assure adequate affordable housing in
areas likely to experience in-migration, will be needed.125
123. Cf. Siders, supra note 23, at 29 (stating, in the context of state-issued
planning mandates, how clear state-set goals are important to and enhance
the quality of local planning). Pragmatic actors, like the Association of State
Floodplain Managers, have called for national leadership in floodplain and
coastal areas management, urging the adoption of federal policies to be
implemented by states and other subnational institutions. Hudson, supra
note 39, at 2046-47.
124. The federal government has taken this approach for high-risk coastal
barrier islands, which are not eligible for federal flood insurance and other
federal funding. Siders, supra note 23, at 22.
125. See Glicksman, supra note 94, at 1190 (noting that states could try and
block climate-sparked immigration).
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Last, but not least, federal parameters could help protect
potentially marginalized populations in the difficult land use
decision-making that lies ahead. Federally required climate
assessments could require local governments to identify the
demographic characteristics of impacted areas. While local control
over key land use decision-making remains essential, certain
suspect approaches, like pure reliance on land value in decisionmaking, could be precluded. In land use adaptation plans, local
governments could be required to explain how they are addressing
the needs of marginalized communities and others at particular
risk from climate change.126
B. FederalResources to FacilitateSubnationalAdaptation Land
Use Measures
The federal government could also facilitate state and local
These include
efforts through several practical measures.
providing information, providing financial resources, and
enhancing coordination among the multiplicity of federal, regional,
state, and local entities that all have an interest in land use
related adaptation measures.
1. FederalInformation Resources
A first key function - and one that is already being served to
some extent - is for the federal government to provide climate
information to state and local governments to assist them in
developing both climate risk assessments and appropriate land
use responses.1 27 Local governments have certain informational
advantages: they know about local conditions, needs, and
preferences. However, because many local governments lack the
capacity to evaluate the latest climate science and assess its
implications on local jurisdictions, 128 they could struggle to identify
and assess the range of potential adaptation measures.
A number of federal programs are providing valuable
informational resources to subnational entities. For example, the
U.S. Global Change Research Program has performed periodic
nationwide and regional climate impact assessments, with the
latest due to be released in 2014.129 NOAA provides adaptation
information and resources for coastal area planning and

126. See VERCHICK, supra note 30, at 3 (articulating "Be Fair" as a guiding
disaster law principle).
127. See Glicksman, supra note 94, at 1181-82 (describing value of federal
role in providing information).
128. Draft Third Assessment, supra note 6, at 428; Adapting to the Impacts
of Climate Change, supra note 2, at 75.
129. Assess the U.S. Climate, U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM,
http://www.globalchange.gov/what-we-do/assessment (last visited Mar. 2,
2014).
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programs, 130 and the U.S. Geological Survey engages in scientific
research to better understand the physical impacts of climate
change. 13 1 EPA provides a broad range of information on climate
impacts and links to programs offering more specific data and
information, 132 as well as having developed specific programs to
support particular adaptation challenges. 133
The federal government can provide essential information not
only about climate impacts, but also about measures to address
among
Notwithstanding substantial differences
them.
jurisdictions, many face common challenges in assessing both the
practical and legal implications of a variety of potential adaptation
measures. The federal government should continue to provide a
clearinghouse for state and local efforts. 134 Additionally, the
federal government could assess state and local efforts, helping to
ensure that other jurisdictions learn from the strengths and
weaknesses of state and local approaches.
2. FederalFinancialResources

Adaptation will be expensive. 135 Climate assessments and
land use planning to address impacts are costly in and of
themselves. Implementing measures to adapt could cost even
more. While some measures, like requiring permeable pavements
or set-backs or fire buffers, would fall largely on private entities,
Coastal Climate Adaptation: Resources, NOAA
130. See, e.g.,
(last visited
http://collaborate.csc.noaa.gov/cimateadaptation/default.aspx
Feb. 18, 2013).
Change,
U.S.G.S.
Use
Land
and
131. Climate
http://www.usgs.gov/climate janduse/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2013).
132. See Climate Change Impacts and Adapting to Change, U.S. E.P.A.
http://www.epa.gov/cimatechange/impacts-adaptation/ (last visited, Dec. 27,
2013).
133. EPA's Climate-Ready Estuaries and Climate-Ready Water Utilities
programs provide federal information and assistance to local and regional
See Federal and EPA Adaptation Programs, U.S. E.P.A.,
entities.
http://www.epa.gov/cimatechange/impacts-adaptation/fed-programs.html (last
visited Dec. 27, 2013). Additionally, all of EPA's program and regional offices
are developing adaptation plans that include support for state, regional, and
See EPA Adaptation Implementation Plans, U.S. E.P.A.,
local efforts.
http://www.epa.gov/cimatechange/impacts-adaptation/fed-programs/EPAimpl-plans.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2013).
134. See Climate Change Impacts and Adapting to Climate Change, U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/cimatechange/impacts-adaptation/, (last visited Mar. 2,
2014) (providing links to webpages for each region, webpages that include
numerous examples of state and local adaptation initiatives).
135. Although subject to considerable uncertainty, the cost of U.S.
adaptation measures is estimated to be in the billions of dollars. See generally
Fran Sussman, et al., Climate change adaptationcost in the US: what do we
available
at
(2013),
Policy
242
CLIMATE
know?
14
http://www.tandfonline.com/doilabs/10.1080/14693062.2013.777604#preview
(explaining that these estimates do not focus solely on urban land use related
measures, but they do provide a sense of the scale of the challenge).
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local governments could confront significant local expenditures.
As noted above, implementation measures could include relocating
infrastructure, exercising eminent domain, or purchasing
conservation easements to control development in at-risk areas.
While expensive, adaptation is a wise investment because funding
adaptation measures now will cost less than incurring the
damages anticipated from harm. 3 6
Certain large municipalities, like Chicago and New York,
have the financial resources to engage in sophisticated climate
assessments and planning. However, many cities and states are
unable to adequately assess risks, plan, or implement adaptation
measures because they lack sufficient financial resources. 3 7
These efforts are unlikely to be realized without federal funding. 3 8
Federal funding would also even out income disparities among
municipalities, so that poorer cities have the same opportunities to
prepare for climate change as wealthier areas.139
Some might argue that state and local governments should
not receive federal funding for planning and implementation
measures that primarily provide local benefits.140 However, at this
point, areas vulnerable to climate change are not responsible for

136. See Climate change: the cost of inaction and the cost of adaptation,
EUROPEAN
ENVIRONMENT
AGENCY
7
(2007)
available
at
http://www.tandfonline.com/doilabs/10.1080/14693062.2013.777604#preview
(describing initial assessment that, in Europe, the costs of adaptation would
be lower than the costs of inaction).
137. Carmin et al, supra note 74, at 20-22; see also Glicksman, supra note
94, at 1182 (noting that even if states have the incentive to act, they lack
necessary resources).
138. Such federal funding for state and local land use planning is not
uncommon in federal environmental laws; the CZMA and the Clean Water
Act's nonpoint source control programs provide state and local planning funds.
See Funding, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, OCEAN & COASTAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT,
http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/funding/welcome.html (last visited Mar. 2,
2014) (describing NOAA's financing of coastal management programs); NonPoint
Source-Relate
Funding
Opportunities,
EPA,
http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/nps/funding.cfm#content (last visited Mar. 2,
2014) (describing EPA funding for state nonpoint source control programs).
Notably, federal planning requirements that have not received full funding
have lagged in implementation.
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 794-96 (7th ed.
2013). Current funding levels are, however, insufficient to fund large-scale
coastal adaptation programs. See Adapting to the Impacts of Climate Change,
supra note 2, at 75.
139. See Farber, supra note 83, at 271 (observing that poorer areas of the
country may not be able to finance adaptation measures); see generally
Davidson, supra note 80, at 1012 (suggesting that federal financing can be
targeted to poorer communities to remedy existing inequities in available
funds).
140. See generally Farber, supra note 83, at 269-72 (discussing whether the
federal government should finance adaptation measures).
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the impacts they will experience.14 1 Additionally, as noted above,
if financial support reduces the federal government's future
disaster-related expenditures, the benefits of providing financial
support will extend well beyond the local level.
At this point in time, however, federal funding for
comprehensive state and local adaptation planning and measures
is not available. New federal funding mechanisms are necessary
to actuate these proposals. The most plausible source of federal
financing would be federal climate legislation that puts a price on
carbon and then devotes some portion of the revenue to fund
adaptation measures, effectively internalizing the cost of climate
harms.
As a practical matter, this essay does not resolve the question
of what subnational entity should receive funding. Arguably, the
federal government could use states as intermediaries by
allocating funds to states and having them, in turn, allocate
assessment, planning, and implementation money.142
3. Federally-facilitatedCoordination
A federal role would be useful not only in requiring
assessments and planning, providing information, and financing
state and local efforts, but also in creating frameworks that
coordinate and rationalize the network of federal, state, regional,
and local programs that currently implicate adaptation and land
use. 143 The challenge is in coordinating both vertically - among
federal, state, regional, and local programs - and horizontally,
among multiple agencies and entities that have some interest in or
authority over adaptation and land use. Such coordination is
independent of any substantive or procedural federal
requirements. Instead, federal coordination would facilitate the
work of other entities by enhancing communication and creating
opportunities for synergistic efficiencies.
141. See id. at 272 (noting that public financing for adaptation is premised
on "the idea that climate change is a national problem" and "that society as a
whole should protect individuals.").
142. Where federal programs are intended to influence local action, states
often serve an intermediary role. At the same time, some analysts suggest
that a more direct federal to local connection, with little role for the states as
intermediaries, is preferable. Davidson, supra note 80; see also Ostrow, supra
note 64, at 1437-38 (suggesting that direct federal influence over local land use
could be preferable to having states as an intermediary). This essay focuses
on the importance of a federal role, and does not resolve the role of the states.
143. See Draft Third Assessment, supra note 6, at 430 (discussing need for
coordination that transcends municipal boundaries); see also Siders, supra
note 23, at 34 (discussing importance of coordinated state and local adaptation
planning for sea level rise); Glicksman, supra note 94, at 1183 (suggesting
federal role in coordinating state and local adaptation policy); Hudson, supra
note 39, (observing how fragmented and uncoordinated land use planning
throughout the Mississippi River hinders land-use related disaster mitigation
measures).
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Federal initiatives could facilitate horizontal coordination
among the many different federal agencies whose work involves
land use and adaptation, including disaster, housing, wetlands,
storm water, transportation, and other programs. This process,
already initiated by the President's Interagency Adaption Task
Force, is continuing through the newly constituted Council on
Climate Preparedness and Resilience. 144 At the subnational level,
many state and local agencies are already developing networks to
enhance horizontal and vertical communication and adaptation
planning.145 The federal government could supplement and
expand these initiatives, working to facilitate coordination where
state and local entities have lacked either the resources or the will
to develop their own networks.
V. POLITICAL FEASIBILITY
To succeed, new federal planning requirements and
substantive parameters for state and local governments will
require a range of incentives and disincentives. Federal funding is
needed, not only because state and local governments lack the
necessary resources, but to overcome political resistance to federal
requirements. 146 Additional benefits, like the federal consistency
requirement under the CZMA,1 47 could provide similar assistance.
Similarly, effective implementation requires "sticks" as well as
carrots.148 For example, as occurs under the Clean Air Act, state
and local governments failing to engage in required planning could
face the threat of federal planning. 4 9 Alternatively, as occurs to
144. Interagency climate Change Adaptation Task Force, supra note 41;
Executive Order,supra note 43.
145. There have been various intrastate collaborations among local
governments. Climate Change Collaboration in the Pacific Northwest (C3),
http://www.c3.gov/;
Gulf
of
Mexico
Alliance,
http://www.gulfofmexicoalliance.org/index.php;
Western
Governors'
Association, http://www.westgov.org/ (interstate collaborations); Colorado
Climate Network, http://www.coclimatenetwork.org/index.html; Green Cities
California, http://greencitiescalifornia.org/; Oregon Coastal Management
Program, http://www.oregon.gov[LCD/OCMP/Pages/index.aspx;
Southeast
Florida
Regional
Climate
Change
Compact,
http://www.broward.org/NaturalResources/ClimateChange/Pages/SoutheastFl
oridaRegionalClimateCompact.aspx; Wisconsin Initiative on Climate Change
Impacts, http://www.wicci.wisc.edu/index.php.
146. Cf. Hudson, supra note 39, at 2049 (discussing need for financial
"carrots" to induce local government disaster planning).
147. Under the CZMA, federal actions must conform to statewide land use
plans developed under the CZMA. See Siders, supra note 23, at 23. The
legislative history reveals Congress' belief that the requirement that federal
actions conform to state plans is "the single greatest incentive for State
participation in the coastal zone management program." Id. (citing legislative
history).
148. Cf. Hudson, supra note 39, at 2054-57 (discussing federal "sticks" to
induce state and local participation in disaster mitigation planning).
149. One of the sanctions for states that fail to complete adequate state
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some degree under FEMA, the availability of disaster mitigation
or disaster relief funds could be linked to participation in required
planning. 5 0
New adaptation land use legislation will pose a particularly
significant political challenge. Proposals to expand federal control
over land use are controversial and have not fared well
historically. In the 1970s, federal legislation proposing a federal
framework for local planning failed notwithstanding widespread
recognition of the national interest in local land use measures. 15 1
Provisions in the original Clean Air Act that encouraged land use
measures were later stripped out.152
Nonetheless, times change. Climate change presents local
governments with huge risks, risks that many municipalities are
unprepared to manage alone. The federal government could
provide needed resources, including information, enhanced
coordination, financial and technical assistance, and some
alleviation of responsibility. If the benefits provided by federal
engagement in adaptation-related land use measures are
appealing enough, then it is possible that the political winds could
shift in favor of a more productive and comprehensive integration
of federal, state, and local roles, an integration necessary to face
the critical land use challenges that lie ahead.

implementation plans is a federal implementation plan. Clean Air Act
§ 110(c)(1).
150. Hudson, supra note 39, at 2055.
151. In the 1970s, the proposed but unsuccessful National Land Use Policy
Act would have provided funding and a national data system for state land use
planning. See generally Fred Bosselman, The Twilight of National Land Use
Policy, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 237 (Winter 2012) (describing the history of
the proposed National Land Use Policy Act); Ostrow, supra note 64, at 140607.
152. The original Clean Air Act required states failing to achieve air quality
standards to develop land use control measures that would reduce driving and
Facing intense resistance, Congress
its associated pollution emissions.
ultimately removed the requirement, see Ostrow, supra note 64, at 1407, and
added language reaffirming that the Clean Air Act does not infringe upon local

land use control. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7431.
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